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MANDATING DISCRETION: JUVENILE SENTENCING SCHEMES
AFTER MILLER V ALABAMA

Jennifer S. Breen and John R. Mills*
ABSTRACT

Miller v. Alabama established that "children are different" and it required
profound changes in the way states adjudicatejuveniles within the criminaljustice
system.1 This Article moves beyond standard interpretationsof this significant
decision and argues that Miller requires much more than abolition of mandatory
juvenile life-without-parole sentences. In addition to that sentence-specific ban,
Miller establishes a right for juveniles to have their young age taken into
consideration during sentencing. This holding demands individualized consideration of a child's age at sentencing, akin to sentencing procedures demanded by
the Court in death penalty cases. At the very least, it is clear that states may no
longer treat a juvenile defendant as an adult without any opportunity to consider
the impact of youth upon the defendant. Yet this Article identifies eighteen states
that continue to utilize these now unconstitutionalsentencing schemes, contravening the most basic holding of the Court in Miller: "[C]hildrenare constitutionally
2
different from adultsfor purposes of sentencing."
After contextualizing both the Miller decision and the process of transferring
juveniles to adult court, this Article identifies a subset of states thatfail to allowfor
consideration of the unique qualities of youth at any stage of the juvenile
adjudicationprocess. These states are outliers and defy both the national consensus on juvenile adjudication and the Court's mandate in Miller. This Article
concludes by proposing reforms to aid states in accommodating the implicationsof
Miller while increasing reliabilityin juvenile sentencing.
INTRODUCTION

In Millerv. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that
"children are different" and, therefore, require "individualized consideration" of
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1. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012).
2 Id at 2464
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their age before sentencing. 3 The Court's narrow holding was that the Eighth
Amendment bars mandatory sentences of life without parole for persons under the
age of eighteen at the time of their crimes. 4
Miller was one of four recent cases that demonstrate increased sensitivity to how
the unique attributes of youth affect juveniles' interaction with the criminal justice
system and invoke either the Fifth or Eighth Amendments. In the cases addressing
the Eighth Amendment, the Court held that states must take account of the fact that
juveniles' culpability and potential for rehabilitation is categorically different than
adults. As a result, the Court held in each case that the standard penological
justifications for punishment simply do not make sense when applied to juveniles.
In the lone Fifth Amendment case, the Court acknowledged juveniles' unique
vulnerabilities to situations beyond their control and accordingly demanded
greater procedural protections for juvenile defendants. In each of the cases, the
Court broke new ground in providing more robust procedural and substantive
protections for juveniles.
The Miller decision changes juvenile sentencing in ways that are different in
kind from these earlier precedents. In Miller, the Court established a special right
for children, namely, individualized consideration of their age in crafting a
sentence. The Court embraced the principle that children are different, and
therefore worthy of special treatment at sentencing. The Court's reasoning relies
on its "death is different" jurisprudence regarding the death penalty, yet even that
line of cases has limited application to the holding of Miller because the
vulnerabilities of childhood provide the only distinction between Miller and other
relevant case law on sentencing. Put another way, Miller creates a set of rights for
juveniles based on the young age of the offender, whereas the Court's "death is
different" jurisprudence establishes rights based on the offense. Neither the
sentence imposed nor its relationship to the crime charged (the traditional
components of a proportionality analysis) marked this case as deserving of special
treatment. Yet the defendants in Miller did receive special treatment from the
Court, for the simple yet profound reason that they are children, a distinction that
now has new and broad significance for applications of the Eighth Amendment.
We believe that Miller establishes a new right for juvenile defendants; namely,
that youth be taken into consideration as a factor in individualized sentencing. We
argue further that a number of states currently employ sentencing schemes that are
manifestly unconstitutional after Miller because they fail to take account of youth
3. Id. at 2469-70.
4. Id. at 2460.
5. We make this claim despite the Court's half-hearted insistence that there is some correspondence between
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles and the death penalty. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466-67. We find this
argument unpersuasive given the Court has flatly banned juvenile death sentences as violations of the Eighth
Amendment, but refused to do the same regarding life-without-parole sentences. If the two were truly
comparable, life-without-parole sentences should be banned. Instead, the Court required sentencers to consider
the offender's age in sentencing. The key category in Miller is age, not the crime or sentence.
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at any stage in the juvenile's adjudication. These state schemes, we argue, are
unconstitutional under even a more narrow reading of the Miller holding than the
one this Article offers.
This Article will proceed in several parts. Section I will establish the context of
Miller, first by explaining how juvenile transfer into adult criminal court affects
the children transferred, and then by providing an overview of recent Supreme
Court case law addressing juveniles in the criminal justice system.6 Section II
explains why, after Miller, children are entitled to their own special category of
analysis under the Eighth Amendment. Section III explores the current and future
impact of Miller. Part A applies the Court's "objective indicia" approach to two
types of sentencing schemes (including a comprehensive list of specific statutes)
that are national outliers, contrary to the national consensus, and out of step with
the Court's holding in Miller. Part B discusses several approaches that could
replace these constitutionally insufficient approaches to juvenile sentencing.
Finally, Part C suggests several reforms that might increase reliability in the
adjudication process and thereby diminish the risk of arbitrary sentences imposed
upon juvenile offenders.
There has been much debate regarding the significance of Miller and some of
that debate will be addressed below. Miller presents a robust challenge to current
systems of juvenile justice, with significant implications for children across the
nation.
I. JUVENILE TRANSFER AND PRIOR SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON JUVENILE
OFFENDERS

Miller v. Alabama is the product of the intersection of a criminal justice system
that regularly treats children as adults and a series of Supreme Court decisions
challenging that practice. Accordingly, we preface our discussion of the significance of Miller with background on both how juveniles end up in adult court
facing adult sentences and the key cases that preceded Miller.
A. The Nuts and Bolts of Juvenile Transferand Sentencing
As an initial matter, children charged with criminal conduct are generally treated
differently than adults. They are tried in specialized courts and provided protections that recognize the vulnerabilities of youth. They are also sentenced with a
different set of interests in mind: juvenile courts recognize youth's greater capacity
for rehabilitation and greater vulnerability to their circumstances. Thus, when

6. With the exception of J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011), the cases highlighted are those that
address the Eighth Amendment's impact on juvenile sentences. J.D.B. is included both because it embraces the
"children are different" language that drives the other cases and because it highlights the applicability of this
principle to a procedural context. See id. at 2394 (holding that a child's age should inform police custody
analysis).
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crafting remedial action, juvenile courts are generally afforded much greater
discretion than adult courts.
1. The Recent History of Juvenile Sentencing
This approach to juvenile justice is a legacy of Progressive Era reforms that
embraced the idea that the goal of juvenile justice is rehabilitation, not punishment. 7 This Progressive Era version of the "children are different" approach to
juvenile justice included an additional key difference between adult and juvenile
justice: the procedural protections given to adults were not required for juvenile
dispositions. 8 In this era, the basic procedural protections of our adversarial
criminal justice system played no role in a system focused on how best to treat the
child in need of help and rehabilitation. Perversely, the lack of procedural
protections given to juveniles was intended to promote the rehabilitative, rather
than punitive, goals of juvenile justice.9
This approach to juvenile justice changed with the Supreme Court's decision in
In re Gault, which reshaped the contours of juvenile adjudication. The Court held
that juveniles are entitled to the basic requirements of due process.'O Due process
in a juvenile disposition required written notice of the basis of delinquency
allegations, confrontation of witnesses against the juvenile, and advisement of the
right to counsel and of their privilege against self-incrimination." These due
process requirements provided important basic procedural protections for adjudicated youth. But as the formerly stark procedural distinctions between juvenile and
adult adjudications began to fade, the Court largely left states unsupervised in their
reform efforts, even as many states dramatically shifted the purpose of juvenile
justice from rehabilitation to punishment and sentenced juveniles to ever-harsher
punishments.' 2

7. See Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile's Right to Age-Appropriate Sentencing, 47 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 457, 465, passim (2012), for a more thorough overview of the history ofjuvenile justice reform
and Supreme Court decisions related to juveniles since In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1(1967).
8. Id.
at 464-66.
9. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1967) (noting that the purportedly rehabilitative purpose of juvenile
procedures, up to that point, served to avoid any "constitutional grief' associated with providing children with
meaningful procedural protections).
10. Id. at 30-31; see also Guggenheim, supra note 7, at 467-69 ("It would be difficult to overstate In re Gault's
importance to the field of juvenile justice, specifically, and to children's rights generally. In re Gaultso thoroughly
repudiated the idea that denying children procedural rights may be good for them that modem readers may miss
just how strongly the contrary belief was held.").
11. In re Gault,387 U.S. at 31-34, 34-42, 44-56, 56-57.
12. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 109 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting increase in length of
juvenile sentences between 1990 and 2010). The dramatic increase in incarceration has been linked to causes as
disparate as racism and lead poisoning. See MIcHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 178-220 (rev. ed. 2012) (discussing the phenomenon of mass incarceration resulting

from systematic discrimination of people, primarily men, of color); Rick Nevin, How Lead Exposure Relates to
Temporal Changes in IQ, Violent Crime, and Unwed Pregnancy, 83 ENVIRON. REs. 1, 17 (2000) (finding that
increased exposure to lead within the population is consistent with increased violence and crime rates).
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2. Transfersfrom Juvenile Adjudication to Adult Courts with Adult Sentences
Since In re Gault, states have enacted laws specifying the circumstances and
methods by which juveniles may-or in many cases, must-be moved into adult
court for trial and sentencing.' 3 Once transferred to adult court, the juveniles are
largely treated as adults. Many of these transfer provisions have been around for
years, but the 1990s witnessed a boom in juvenile transfer as legislatures
responded to an increase in juvenile crime with an expansion of the crimes and
categories of juvenile offenders eligible for trial and sentencing in adult criminal
court.' 4 Between 1992 and 1999, "forty-nine states and the District of Columbia
enacted or expanded their transfer provisions, meaning that state legislatures
increasingly moved juvenile offenders into criminal court based on age and/or the
seriousness of the offense charged."' 5 As a result, tens of thousands of children
each year are processed in adult criminal courts.' 6 There have been further
legislative changes to juvenile sentencing procedures in the wake of the Supreme
Court decisions discussed below, but these revisions have
not affected whether
7
juveniles are transferred into adult court in the first place.1

13. For a concise yet thorough overview of juvenile transfer, including its historical development, see
generally Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudenceof Death and Youth: Now the Twain Should Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L.
REv. 29 (2013).
14. PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 9 (2011), available at

www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/232434.pdf; Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile
Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. REV.99, 107-08 (2010).
15. Tamar R. Birckhead, North Carolina, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, and the Resistance to Reform, 86
N.C. L. REV. 1443, 1488-89 (2008).
16. A 2005 study by the Coalition for Juvenile Justice estimated that as many as 27,000 children are sent to
adult court through a direct file procedure and 7,500 are waived into the criminal court by a judge (these
procedures are discussed infra). COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, CHILDHOOD ON TRIAL: THE FAILURE OF TRYING AND

SENTENCING YOUTH INADULT CRIMINAL COURT 8 (2005), available at www.issuelab.org/resource/childhood

on_

trial the failure_of-trying-andsentencingyouth in adult criminalcourt. Thousands more youths are transferred in through statutory exclusion and direct file mechanisms (discussed infra), but "state data are hard to find
and even more difficult to assess accurately," as only thirteen states publicly report the total number of their
transfers. GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 1, 12. A 2011 study estimates that 23.7% of transfers occur through a
judicial waiver process, 34.7% occur through prosecutorial waivers, and 41.6% occur through statutory

exclusions. Id. at 12. In addition to these transfer mechanisms, 218,000 children per year are tried and sentenced
in adult court solely because they live in a state that prosecutes sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds as adults. COAL.
FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra, at 18. Two states send all sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds to adult court and an
additional eleven states do the same for seventeen-year-olds, no matter how minor the offense. StatisticalBriefing
Book, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (2011), www.ojjdp.gov/

ojstatbb/structure-process/qa04101.asp. We focus our attention on the transfer mechanisms discussed infra, but
the logic of the argument of the article extends to the states that treat children under the age of eighteen as though
they were adults. See COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra, at 8, 17-21.

17. In the wake of Graham and Miller, some states adopted sentencing provisions specifically for juveniles
tried in adult court for crimes that would otherwise result in a sentence that would violate the narrowest dictates of
the Supreme Court's recent decisions. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 15A-1340.19B-19D (2014) (giving trial court

discretion to sentence juveniles convicted of premeditated and deliberated murder to either twenty-five years to
life or life without parole); WY. ANN. STAT. § 6-2-101 (b) (2014) (providing that a person convicted of murder in the
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There are three general approaches jurisdictions use to transfer a juvenile
offender to adult criminal court where the juvenile will be exposed to adult
sentences: prosecutorial discretion, judicial waiver, and statutory exclusion.' 8 In
most cases, the law combines a particular crime with a method of transfer and a
minimum age of the juvenile offender.
Prosecutorial discretion allows the prosecutor to decide whether to file charges
in juvenile or criminal court.' 9 In these regimes, prosecutors are generally given
limitless discretion to determine whether a case should go forward in adult
court-with adult outcomes-or whether it should go forward in juvenile court.2 °
Judicial waiver permits juvenile courts to waive jurisdiction over a particular
case, which results in its transfer to adult criminal court. The standards considered
in a waiver hearing-if any are required at all-vary by state and produce waiver
schemes that are either discretionary, presumptive, or mandatory. Discretionary
judicial waiver generally permits or requires a judge to consider an enumerated set
of factors, including the seriousness of the crime and the characteristics of the
juvenile. 2 1 Presumptive judicial waiver of juvenile jurisdiction creates a presumption that the juvenile court will waive jurisdiction for a prescribed set of offenses.22
Generally, the presumption can be overcome in a hearing, where the question is
whether the severity of the crime and/or the characteristics of the juvenile warrant
judicial waiver.23 Mandatory judicial waiver generally requires a juvenile court to
waive jurisdiction if it finds probable cause to believe enumerated crimes have
been committed.2 4 In this approach, there is no consideration of the individual
characteristics of the juvenile.2 5

first degree who was under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense shall be punished by life imprisonment,
rather than death or life imprisonment without parole).
18. See infra Table 1; GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 1-2.

19. These laws are also referred to as direct file or concurrent jurisdiction laws. See GRIFFIt ET AL., supra note
14, at 2; see also Wayne A. Logan, Proportionalityand Punishment: Imposing Life Without Paroleon Juveniles,
33 WAKE FOREST L. REV.681, 715 (1998) (describing prosecutorial discretion jurisdictions).
20. Florida's process, for example, grants prosecutor's the option for certain offenses to charge sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds either as an adult or as a juvenile. FLA. STAT. § 985.557(l)(b) (2014).
21. See GRIFFIN ETAL., supra note 14, at 2; see also Note, Juvenile Delinquents:The Police,State Courts, and
Individualized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REv. 775, 775 (1966) (describing judicial discretion jurisdictions). North
Carolina's process for most crimes illustrates the lack of standards in some jurisdictions: "After notice, hearing,
and finding of probable cause the court may... transfer jurisdiction over a juvenile to superior court." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7B-2200 (2014) (emphasis added). The statute provides little guidance as to what it should consider when
the court exercises its discretion (and no direction about how to weigh the few factors it enumerates). See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7B-2203(b).

22. See GRIFFIN ETAL., supra note 14, at 2; see also Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal
Justice System, 27 CRIME & JUST. 81, 92 (2000) (describing presumptive judicial waiver jurisdictions).
23. Utah creates a presumption in favor of adjudication in adult court for certain offenses where the offender is
at least sixteen years old. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-702 (2014).
24. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 2; see also Hoeffel, supra note 13, at 50 (describing mandatory
judicial waiver jurisdictions).
25. North Carolina's process for Class A felonies (most often first degree murder) illustrates mandatory
transfer: "If the alleged felony constitutes a Class A felony and the court finds probable cause, the court shall
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Finally, statutory exclusion refers to criminal code definitions of certain offenses
as exclusively within the jurisdiction of the criminal court, leaving no discretion to
either the prosecutor or judge.2 6 Statutory exclusion and mandatory judicial waiver
are functionally identical: if there is probable cause to believe certain crimes have
been committed, jurisdiction lies exclusively in adult court.
Many states tweak one of these basic structures in ways that either mitigate the
harshness of juvenile transfer or exacerbate it. These changes fall into one of three
categories. First, "once an adult, always an adult" refers to statutes that dictate that
once a juvenile has been convicted in a criminal court, any subsequent offense
must be prosecuted in adult criminal court with adult sentencing, no matter how
minor the subsequent infraction.27 Reverse waivers, by contrast, allow the adult
criminal court to send a case back to juvenile court, following a hearing or other
required considerations and procedures. This procedure allows the adult court to
partially consider a juvenile's age-related vulnerabilities.2 8 Finally, blended sentencing allows a variance from the required sentence. Blended adult criminal
sentencing allows a criminal court to impose a juvenile disposition. Blended
juvenile sentencing allows a juvenile court to impose a criminal punishment. Thus,
blended sentencing can either ensure a juvenile is treated as a juvenile or allow the
court to impose an adult sentence, depending on the type of blended sentencing
29
regime.

In sum, depending on the specific provision, statutes that set up transfer schemes
may either affect the scope of the juvenile court's jurisdiction or a court's ability to

transfer the case to the superior court for trial as in the case of adults." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2200 (2014). The
existence of different processes in North Carolina for different crimes illustrates the complexity ofjuvenile justice
more broadly.
26. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 2; see also Hoeffel, supra note 13, at 50. In California, for example,
offenders above the age of fourteen who are charged with murder will be tried and sentenced in adult criminal
court through a statutory exclusion mechanism; an offender above the age of sixteen charged with any offense
may be transferred to adult criminal court through a judicial waiver mechanism, upon motion of the prosecutor.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 602(b)(1), 707.01(a)(5)(A) (West 2014).
27. These statutes limit the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 2. North
Carolina's relevant statute, for example, excludes sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds from juvenile court jurisdiction (a separate serious issue for juvenile adjudication applicable to only two states in the nation, see supra note
16), as well as any juvenile with a prior criminal court conviction: "A juvenile who is transferred to and convicted
in superior court shall be prosecuted as an adult for any criminal offense the juvenile commits after the superior
court conviction." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B- 1604(b) (2014).
28. See GRIFFIN ETAL., supra note 14, at 2; see also State v. Martin, 530 N.W.2d 420,422 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)
(describing Wisconsin as reverse waiver jurisdiction). Arizona, for example, offers the possibility of reverse
waiver for some offenses. Its statute directs a judge to send the juvenile back to juvenile court "[i]f the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that public safety and the rehabilitation of the juvenile, if adjudicated
delinquent, would be best served by transferring the prosecution to the juvenile court." ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-504(C) (2014). The statute orders the court to consider ten enumerated factors, including "the seriousness of
the offense" and "the record and previous history of the juvenile" in rendering its decision. § 13-504(D).
29. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 2; In re J.V., 979 N.E.2d 1203, 1207-08 (Ohio 2012) (describing
blended sentencing in Ohio). New Mexico gives courts the "discretion to invoke either an adult sentence or
juvenile sanctions on a youthful offender." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-20(A) (2014).
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tailor a remedy for a juvenile's conduct. Transfer schemes thus vary widely as to
how they impact our criminal justice system's ability to take account of the age of a
juvenile. Transfers effect on juvenile offenders cannot be overstated and follow
directly from the rationale that differentiates juvenile court from criminal court.
Juvenile court dispositions are focused on rehabilitation-indeed, courts have held
that there is a "right to treatment" for juveniles in a delinquency adjudication. 30 By
contrast, criminal court sanctions are aimed at retribution and, in many cases,
apply only to juveniles whom the court has found to be beyond the reach of
rehabilitation. 3 1 Further, a juvenile disposition does not subject the offender to the
lifelong stigma of a criminal record, since juvenile records are usually closed and,
therefore, do not follow the juvenile into adulthood.3 2 Finally, children who
receive criminal sentences are more likely to reoffend, to reoffend quickly, or to
reoffend violently than children who receive the supervision, treatment, and
rehabilitative services exclusively available within the juvenile system.33 The
consequences of the rise in juvenile transfers are thus significant. A corresponding
rejection of that process-or at the very least an obligation to consider the
individual juvenile before transferring out of juvenile court-could have profound
lifelong consequences for adjudicated youth. Miller's profound effect on these
schemes is discussed below.
B. Juveniles in the Court Before Miller: "Children are not adults"34
In the seven years preceding Miller, the Supreme Court decided three cases
recognizing that, in matters of criminal
35 punishment and procedure, children are
fundamentally different than adults. The first case, Roper v. Simmons, invalidated

30. Compare Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 359-60 (7th Cir. 1974) (collecting cases finding right to
rehabilitative treatment), with Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (1st Cir. 1983) (concluding there is no
such right to rehabilitative training).
31. Arya, supra note 14, at 123-24.
32. Id. at 107 n.45; see also Birckhead, supra note 15, at 1454-58 (discussing the impact of a criminal record
on higher education and employment); 43 C.J.S. Infants § 171 (2014) (noting statutory provisions for protection
of information about juvenile dispositions).
33. Arya, supra note 14, at 106. A 2010 report by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
within the Department of Justice examined the results of six recent large-scale studies and determined:
All of the studies found higher recidivism rates among offenders who had been transferred to
criminal court, compared with those who were retained in the juvenile system ....Thus, the
extant research provides sound evidence that transferring juvenile offenders to the criminal court
does not engender community protection by reducing recidivism. On the contrary, transfer
substantially increases recidivism.
RICHARD E.REDDING, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE
TRANSFER LAWS: AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO DELINQUENCY? 6 (2010), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/
ojjdp/220595.pdf. See also Birckhead, supra note 15, at 1460-63 (discussing empirical study of impact of
sentencing children as adults on recidivism rates).
34. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011).
35. Prior to these cases, the last significant Supreme Court case addressing juvenile justice was in 2000. It dealt
with whether an anonymous tip was sufficient to justify a Terry stop. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000).
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the death penalty for children who were sixteen or seventeen at the time of the
offense. 36 The Court applied the framework used for analyzing "categorical
restrictions on the death penalty.",37 As the Court explained in a later case,
The Court's cases addressing the proportionality of sentences fall within two
general classifications. The first involves, challenges to the length of term-ofyears sentences given all the circumstances in a particular case. The second
comprises cases in which the Court implements the proportionality
standard by
38
certain categorical restrictions on the death penalty.

Roper involved the latter. These categorical challenges follow a two-pronged
methodology. First, the Court examines "objective indicia of society's standards,
as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice to determine whether
there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue., 39 That is, in
addition to legislative acts and the formal legality of a sentence, the Court reviews
actual practice to determine the presence of a national consensus. The Court also
considers public opinion, 4° whether there is a trend in favor of abolishing a
sentence,"' and the worldwide prevalence of a practice. 42 Thus, the first part of the
inquiry is a far-reaching, objective examination of a sentencing practice.
The second prong of the test in "categorical" cases is the Court's use of its
"independent judgment" to determine whether the punishment is disproportionate.43 The Court is guided by the "standards elaborated by controlling precedents
and by the Court's own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose.' 44 This analysis examines the penological justifications for a given punishment: incapacitation, retribution, deterrence,

That case did not include reasoning that was specific to juvenile justice. In 1993, the Court addressed the power of
the Attorney General to restrict release of "juvenile aliens" to their parents, relatives, or legal guardians, except in
"unusual and compelling circumstances." Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 297 (1993). The Court concluded that an
individualized hearing to make such a determination was not required. Id. at 313.
36. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), the Court had previously banned the
death penalty for children who were under sixteen at the time of the offense. The Court's decision in Roper
overturned its prior decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), which had held that the Eighth
Amendment did not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on sixteen- or seventeen-year-old offenders.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-75 (holding that Stanford is no longer controlling on the issue).
37. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010).
38. Id. at 2021.
39. Id. at 2022 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315-16 (2002).
41. Id. at 316 ('The evidence [for a trend against executing the intellectually disabled] carries even greater
force when it is noted that the legislatures that have addressed the issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the
prohibition."); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,422-34 (2008) (considering whether a trend in favor
of capital sentencing for child rape exists and concluding one does not).
42. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) ("Our determination that the death penalty is
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is
the only country in the world that continues to give sanction to the juvenile death penalty.").
43. Id. at 564.
44. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421.
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and rehabilitation. 4 5 "A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is
by its nature disproportionate to the offense," and proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.46 Accordingly, the Court in Atkins v. Virginia held that imposition of
a death sentence on the intellectually disabled was unconstitutional because it
and deterrence, 47 given the impairlacked substantial support based on retribution
48
ments inherent to intellectual disability.
The other challenge to the proportionality of a sentence generally applies to
term-of-years sentences. The Eighth Amendment "'does not require strict proportionality between the crime and the sentence,' but rather 'forbids only extreme
sentences that are "grossly disproportionate" to the crime."' 4 9 Under this approach, the Court first compares the gravity of the offense with the severity of the
sentence.5 0 If it concludes that the sentence is "grossly disproportionate," then it
compares the sentences for similar crimes in the jurisdiction of the sentencing
to determine whether the sentencing court's
court and in other courts' jurisdictions
5'
correct.
is
initial conclusion
In Roper, the Court applied the two-pronged categorical approach and found
that the Eighth Amendment prohibited death sentences for criminal acts of
juveniles. The Court first found a national consensus against executing children.52
The Court then found three fundamental differences between youth and adults that
required their different treatment in sentencing: less ability to engage in good
decision-making, heightened susceptibility to peer pressure, and greater chance for
reform.5 3 The Court found that "[t]he differences between juvenile and adult
a youthful person to
offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing
54
receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability."
In 2010, Grahamv. Floridaexpanded on Roper and held that the imposition of a
life without parole sentence on a juvenile, non-homicide offender violated the
Eighth Amendment. 55 This decision again emphasized the ways in which juveniles
are different from adults, particularly noting the "lessened culpability" of juvenile
offenders. 56 "[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show

45. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010).
46. Id.
47. In determining whether a death sentence in particular is constitutional, the only relevant justifications are
retribution and deterrence. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion). A punishment of death
necessarily accomplishes incapacitation and eliminates hope for rehabilitation.
48. 536 U.S. 304, 318-21 (2002).
49. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997, 1000-1001 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
50. Id. at 2022.
51. Id.
52. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005).
53. Id. at 569-70.
54. Id. at 572-73.
55. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
56. Id. at 2026.
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fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds," which must implicate
the ways in which courts assess the "penological justifications for the sentencing
practice" at issue in the case. 57 After explaining that those "fundamental differences" between juveniles and adults invalidated the sentencing practice at issue in
this case, the Court noted, "An offender's age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws
that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into
58
account at all would be flawed."
Graham was remarkable because the Court for the first time applied the test
reserved for the death penalty to the sentencing of children who had not been
sentenced to death. Although the decision contained significant language suggesting that other aspects of criminal procedure might be "flawed," 59 the reach of the
decision was limited to invalidating the imposition of a substantive sentence: life
without parole for nonhomicide offenses committed by children.6 °
The following year, the Court held in J.D.B. v. North Carolinathat "a child's age
properly informs the Miranda custody analysis."'', This decision emphasized the
"commonsense conclusions" reached by the Court in this and prior cases, most
62
notably that "children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults.",
In short, officers and judges need no imaginative powers, knowledge of
developmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in social
and cultural anthropology to account for a child's age. They simply need the
common sense to know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old and neither is an
adult.

63

In addition, the opinion emphasized "the settled understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth are universal" and, therefore, "apply broadly to
children as a class. '64 The Court was clear that while it might not be true that "a
child's age will be determinative, or even a significant, factor in every case. It is,
65
however, a reality that courts cannot simply ignore.,
In Roper, Graham, and J.D.B., the Court demonstrated a newfound willingness
to regulate juvenile justice. These cases laid the groundwork for a case with much
broader implications for juvenile justice in many states.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 2026, 2028.
Id. at 2026, 2031.
Id.
Id. at 2034.
131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011).
Id. at 2403-04.
ld. at 2407.
Id. at 2403-04.
Id. at 2406 (citations omitted).
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C. Miller v. Alabama: "Childrenare Different"
These cases constitute the immediate backdrop for the Court's decision in Miller
v. Alabama, which explicitly held for the first time that individualized consideration of a juvenile's age must be part of our criminal procedure when fashioning
juvenile sentences. The opinion relied on the same key insights from the recent
juvenile cases: (1) criminal procedure must take a juvenile's age into account, (2)
"children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing,"
and (3) these differences are apparent through "common sense[,] ... science[,]
and social science" in ways that complicate and often weaken traditional "penological justifications" for punishment.6 6 At the same time, the Court shifted its focus
from the penalty imposed to legislative schemes requiring mandatory means of
imposing it.6 7 The Court struck down mandatory life without parole sentencing
schemes for juveniles and targeted the mandatory nature of the sentence as
uniquely troublesome:
By removing youth from the balance-by subjecting a juvenile to the same
life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult-these laws prohibit a
sentencing authority from assessing whether the law's harshest term of
imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender. That contravenes
Graham's (and also Roper's) foundational principle: that imposition of a
State's most severe penalties
on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though
68
they were not children.
In short, if "death is different," as the Court often notes, 69 it must be true that
"children are different too."' 70 The Court then applied its death penalty jurisprudence to explain why the lack of individualized consideration inherent in manda71
tory sentences of life without possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment.
The cases immediately preceding the decision in Miller v. Alabama set the stage
for further expansion of the rights of juveniles within the criminal justice system.
As one scholar has recently noted, the decision in Graham in particular was a
seismic shift in Court philosophy, granting children "a right to be treated as
children even when the state does not agree."7 2 Having made that shift, it is in

66. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464, 2465 (2012).
67. See id. at 2462-65 (emphasizing that courts need to examine the individual characteristics of the offender).
68. Id. at 2466.
69. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) ("This especial concern [with heightened
reliability] is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of
penalties; that death is different."); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (collecting cases
imposing protections in death penalty cases "that the Constitution nowhere else provides").
70. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.
71. Id. at 2463-64 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)).
72. Guggenheim, supra note 7, at 487.
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some ways unsurprising that Miller similarly embraced that doctrine when it
examined mandatory sentences of life without parole.
Responses to the decision indicate a widespread agreement that this holding was
somehow different than the ones that preceded it, yet that consensus does not
extend to the matter of exactly how it is different. The Court's dissenters, for
example, view it as a "way station" on the way to further judicially designated
categorical bars for many types of juvenile sentencing,7 3 while one scholar argues
it backed away from the rationale of the prior cases in refusing a categorical bar on
this particular sentencing practice. 74 Advocates of juvenile justice reform generally praise the decision for its recognition that "children are different, '75 but
disagree exactly how it will affect juvenile sentencing.
Additionally, some critics of the opinion have argued that the mandate of the
case for "individualized sentencing" opens the door to great confusion in lower
76
CoUrtS,
a concern that seems to have been validated in the Court's post-Miller
remand of Mauricio v. California.77 In Mauricio, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and then vacated the state court ruling before remanding it "for further
consideration in light of Miller v. Alabama. '7 8 The confusion is generated by
Mauricio's life without parole sentence pursuant to a sentencing scheme where life
without parole was the presumptive-not mandatory-punishment for his homicide.79 In light of the Court's focus on the mandatory nature of the penalties at
issue in Miller v. Alabama and the remedy, which provided only for individualized

73. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2481-82 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The principle behind today's decision seems to
be only that because juveniles are different from adults, they must be sentenced differently. There is no clear
reason that principle would not bar all mandatory sentences for juveniles, or any juvenile sentence as harsh as
what a similarly situated adult would receive. Unless confined, the only stopping point for the Court's analysis
would be never permitting juvenile offenders to be tried as adults." (citations omitted)).
74. Mary Berkheiser, Developmental Detour: How the Minimalism ofMiller v. Alabama Led the Court's "Kids
are Different" Eighth Amendment JurisprudenceDown a Blind Alley, 46 AKRON L. REV. 489, 507 (2013) ("The
rationale that had led the Court in both Roper and Graham to adopt categorical rules and to reject case-by-case
sentencing ofjuveniles was plainly before the Miller Court. Yet instead of adopting it or explaining why it did not
hold in the cases before it, the Court in Miller took a decided detour, adopting its reasoning about adolescent
differences from adults but not the necessary results of that reasoning, as counseled in both Roper and
Graham ....[T]hose who seek resentencing under Miller will face a head-on collision with everything those
cases warned against.").
75. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2470.
76. Berkheiser, supra note 74, at 516-17; Craig S.Lemer, Sentenced to Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the
Coming Wave of Eighth Amendment Cases, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 30 (2012).
77. No. B224505, 2011 WL 5995976 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2011), cert. granted, vacated, 133 S. Ct. 524
(2012), remandedto No. B224505, 2011 WL 4182454 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2014).
78. 133 S.Ct. at 524.
79. Lyle Denniston, A Puzzle on Juvenile Sentencing, SCOTUSBLoG (Nov. 16,2012,5:20 PM), www.scotusblog.
com/2012/11/a-puzzle-on-juvenile-sentencing; Alexandr Satanovsky, Habeas Corpus-Alex's First Post, HABEAS Coiuus BLOG (Oct. 31, 2012), www.habeascorpusblog.typepad.com/habeas-corpus-blog/2012/10/habeascorpus-alexs-first-post.html. The California courts' treatment of Mauricio and Miller provide further support for a
broad interpretation of Miller. Califomia, however, has consistently required explicit, meaningful consideration
of the juvenile's age in sentencing. See, e.g., People v. Guitierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 249 (Cal. 2014); People v.
Mauricio, No. B224505, 2014 WL 4182454, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2014).
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sentencing rather than a ban on the particular sentence, the remand suggests the
Court might envision Miller as embodying a more expansive rejection of this form
of juvenile sentencing than the limited language of the decision superficially
suggests. 80
Miller marks a new approach to juvenile sentencing with profound implications.
We believe that the Court's holding-that the Eighth Amendment requires youth to
be considered as a factor in sentencing-demands individualized consideration of
juvenile defendants. But even the narrowest interpretation of the decision invalidates a number of currently existing sentencing schemes that treat juveniles as
though they were adults at every stage of the process.
II. CHILDREN MUST RECEIVE INDIVIDUALIZED CONSIDERATION
Miller holds that "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of
eighteen at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
on 'cruel and unusual punishments." ' '8 This relatively narrow holding reflects a
wide-reaching theory: "children are different." 82 But Miller takes the theory in a
new direction. Instead of creating another categorical bar of life without parole
sentences for juveniles-a question the Court certified, 83 but declined to reachthe Court held that juveniles have a right to have their age taken into account
before being sentenced to life without parole.

80. Note that the Court did not even mention California as a state with the kind of sentencing scheme
invalidated by Miller. California has since changed its sentencing procedures, allowing for sentencing review for
juveniles sentenced to life without parole at several regular intervals. See CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF
YOUTH, STATE LEGISLATIVE ROUNDUP ONE YEAR AFTER MiLLER v ALABAMA 2 (2013), available at www.fairsentenc
ingofyouth.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Final-Legislative-Roundup.pdf.
81. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). The decision's reliance on eighteen as the end of
childhood is controversial, most notably within scientific circles. One recent article relies upon recent research,
including a large MacArthur Foundation study of adolescents, to argue that juveniles are constitutionally
incompetent to stand trial. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and
Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REv. 793, 816 (2005) ("Although policymakers draw age boundaries between
childhood and adulthood, it is not .possible to point to a particular age at which youths attain adult-like
psychological capabilities."). More broadly, others have argued that Miller and Grahamhave opened the door to a
more robust proportionality analysis in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, one that must "include a comprehensive and clear analysis of the individual defendant's culpability," including an assessment of "the defendant's
personal background, and the defendant's emotional and mental states." Sara Taylor, Unlocking the Gates of
DesolationRow, 59 UCLA L. REv. 1810, 1817 (2012). On the other hand, others have argued that the Court's cut
off at age eighteen is not inherently irrational because of its basis in legal categories, but has been insufficiently
explained by the Court. See Beth A. Colgan, ConstitutionalLine Drawing at the Intersection of Childhood and
Crime, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 79, 92-93 (2013) (arguing that the Court in Graham,J.D.B., and Miller "missed an
opportunity ... to link the concept of forced environmental and influential circumstances to their decision to draw
the line at eighteen," which would have made these decisions more intellectually coherent). The dissenters in
Miller complain that the cutoff is arbitrary, but with a focus on the culpability of older teenagers. See, e.g., Miller,
132 S. Ct. at 2487 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Miller decision means that "[e]ven a 17 2-year-old who
sets off a bomb in a crowded mall or guns down a dozen students and teachers is a 'child' and must be given a
chance to persuade a judge to permit his release into society").
82. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.
83. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (mem.).
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The Miller holding expands on the same ideas reiterated throughout the Court's
recent juvenile cases-namely, that children have different capabilities than
adults, 84 that the law has long recognized that juveniles are different 8 5 that this
insight relies upon the "common sense [that] ... 'any parent knows,'''86 and
finally that new research on the brain definitively demonstrates that children are
simply not as capable as adults when it comes to reasoned decision-making. 7
These assessments apply to all children and relate to matters that strike at the heart
of our understanding of culpability8 8 in such a way as to make it nonsensical to
treat children as "miniature adults" 89 for purposes of sentencing. Miller repeats the
strongly worded admonition from Graham: "An offender's age.., is relevant to
the Eighth Amendment... [and] criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed." 90 For the purposes of
Miller, these factors led the Court to hold that a sentencing court is required to
"take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison."9 1
In short, the Court banned the imposition of the sentence without considering
the unique characteristics of the juvenile. In simultaneously adding this key
requirement while refraining from banning the sentence outright, the Court
reoriented sentencing procedures for juveniles toward mandating individualized
consideration of the unique vulnerabilities of youth. This shift in focus, away from
the sentence imposed and the type of crime committed and towards the procedure
used by courts to sentence children, marks a fundamental change in the Court's
juvenile jurisprudence. It marked a change from a focus on a particular sentencelife without parole-to the person being sentenced. It represents a shift from "life
without parole for children is different" to "children are different." In Miller, the
Court tells us:
S

"[Y]outh matters for purposes of meting out the law's most serious
punishments." 92

84. Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2464 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,569-70 (2005)) (explaining that there
are three significant areas of gaps between the capabilities of children and adults relevant to these analyses: first,
children lack a fully developed sense of responsibility that leads to reckless behavior; second, children are more
susceptible to peer pressure and have less control over toxic relationships and environments than adults; and
finally, children have a greater prospect for rehabilitation since their characters are "less fixed" than those of
adults).
85. Id. at 2470.
86. Id. at 2464.
87. Id. at 2464-65.
88. Id. at 2463.
89. Id. at 2470 (quoting J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011)).
90. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2031 (2010)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
91. Id. at 2469.
92. Id. at 2471.
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constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
* "[C]hildren 9are
3
sentencing."
94
* There are "fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds."
* "[TIhe distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications
for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they
95
commit terrible crimes."
* "[N]one of what [Graham] said about children-about their distinctive
(and transitory)96 mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities-is
crime-specific."
" "[Y]outh matters in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of
incarceration without the possibility of parole." 97
" "[I]mposition of a State's most severe penalties9 8 on juvenile offenders
cannot proceed as though they were not children."
" "[I]n imposing a State's harshest 99penalties, a sentencer misses too much if
he treats every child as an adult."
* "By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of
that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of
disproportionate punishment."'°0
" "[W]e require [a sentencing court] to take into account how children are
counsel against irrevocably sentencing
different, and how those differences
'10 1
them to a lifetime in prison."
"So if.. . 'death is different,' children are different too."' 1 2 Thus, in Miller the
Court for the first time fully embraced the need for special procedures governing
juvenile sentencing, carving out a special category of protections akin to protections provided in the death penalty context. The Court made that point dramatically when it distinguished Miller from Harmelin v. Michigan, the 1991 case that
03
upheld a mandatory life without parole sentence for cocaine possession.'
Harmelin, and the first two Supreme Court cases to apply the test announced in
Harnelin,'° 4 reflect the peak of the Court's deference to legislatures in matters of
sentencing. 10 5 Until Graham and Miller, the one area of exception to that
deferential posture has been the death penalty, which has always received a more

93. Id. at 2464.
94. Id. (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026).
95. Id. at 2465.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2466.
99. Id. at 2468.
100. Id. at 2469.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2470.
103. Id. (citing Harmelin v. United States, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)).
104. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
105. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1058-61 (2004)
(discussing Harmelin'srole in the Supreme Court's modem jurisprudence).
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searching review by the Court because "death is different." We now know that
"children are different too" and that juvenile sentences ought to be imposed and
assessed under different standards from adults. As the Court clarifies:
Harmelin had nothing to do with children and did not purport to apply its
holding to the sentencing of juvenile offenders. We have by now held on
multiple occasions that a sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so
for children .... Our ruling
thus neither overrules nor undermines nor con06
flicts with Harmelin.

Miller thus requires individualized consideration for juveniles within the criminal justice system because children are different from adults and must be treated so
by the judicial system. Recent cases make clear that this requirement stems from
neither the crime nor the punishment, but rather from the unique characteristics of
youth.
III.

THE CURRENT AND FUTURE IMPACT OF MILLER

The Court's willingness to apply the Eighth Amendment to regulate the
administration of juvenile justice demonstrated in Miller has significant implica-

tions for juveniles in the criminal justice system. First, the holding suggests that
sentencing schemes that mandatorily treat juveniles as adults throughout the entire
process-in other words, schemes that sentence juveniles without any consideration of the fact that they are children-are unconstitutional. Although many states
have schemes that are potentially problematic in light of Miller, we identify as
most problematic those that totally eliminate consideration of a juvenile's age.

Although the Miller decision leaves the status of the objective indicia analysis
somewhat uncertain in the realm of this categorical ban on a sentencing proce-

dure, 10 7 we proceed with that strand of the analysis in demonstrating that only a
minority of states offer their juvenile offenders no treatment as juveniles at all, at

106. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.
107. There is a good deal of criticism regarding the Court's employment of the "objective indicia" analysis,
specifically arguing that the Court uses no clear methodology and does not make clear what kind of "objective"
data is sufficient to constitute a "national consensus." The dissenters in Miller offered this critique, with Justice
Alito making the most forceful case for the irrelevance of the "objective indicia" analysis: "What today's decision
shows is that our Eighth Amendment cases are no longer tied to any objective indicia of society's standards. Our
Eighth Amendment case law is now entirely inward looking." 132 S. Ct. at 2490 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also
Colgan, supra note 81, at 99 n. 103 (arguing that "[d]espite the moniker, the use of these statistics is not objective"
and "[tihe Justices make subjective determinations regarding which of the two types of statistics really matter in a
given case"); Guggenheim, supra note 7, at 460-61 (arguing the objective indicia presented in Graham were "to
say the least, underwhelming" and not actually the source of the Court's decision); see generally Ian P. Farrell,
Abandoning Objective Indicia, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 303 (2013) (arguing that Miller signals the Court's
abandonment of the "objective indicia" approach to Eighth Amendment analysis); Robert J. Smith, Bidish J.
Sarma & Sophie Cull, The Way the Court Gauges Consensus (And-How to Do It Better), 35 CARDOZO L. REV.
2397 (2014) (offering a "systematic analysis of consensus analysis" and proposing a new framework for the court
to better judge national consensus).
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any stage of the process. A small minority of that group exacerbates this
constitutional difficulty with an additional "once an adult, always an adult" rule
that is particularly problematic in light of Miller.
Second, Miller signals the Court's willingness to demand more: specifically, that
juveniles are entitled to procedures that would increase the reliability of juvenile
adjudication by ending practices that arbitrarily and unreasonably treat juveniles as
though they were adults. Regardless of how the juvenile is transferred into adult
court-through a discretionary, presumptive, or mandatory process-Miller suggests that the criminal sentencing of a child must include procedures to ensure that
the child's age is a significant factor in that determination. We build on the Court's
use of its death penalty precedents to call for more demanding standards for
juvenile representation and for the consideration of a broader set of individualized
information about juveniles in tailoring sentences.
A. ProblematicStatutory Schemes
As discussed in Section I.B, in Roper, Graham, and Miller the Court's Eighth
Amendment analysis includes an examination of the "objective indicia of society's
standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice" in search of a
"national consensus" against a particular sentencing regime. 0 8 In some cases, the
Court has found that the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society" bar the sentence through application of the Eighth Amendment. '0 9 This practice usually involves, inter alia, examining state legislative
enactments and to some extent simply counting how many states have such a
practice on the books and, if possible, determining how many states actually enact
the given punishment. If only a minority of states engages in a practice, the Court
may decide to hold that "objective indicia" suggest a "national consensus" against
a particular practice.
Thus, we have identified the jurisdictions that are outliers because they expose
their children to mandatory adult sentences without any consideration of a child's
age. We have also indicated whether those jurisdictions expose juveniles to
mandatory sentences for more than one offense, since several states in our chart
only impose these sentences for a single crime. These jurisdictions with discretionless, mandatory sentencing are particularly problematic in light of Miller's
"children are different" rationale.
1. Mandatory Transfer and Sentencing
A minority of states have constructed schemes that shuttle juveniles charged
with particular crimes directly into adult criminal court, after which courts have no
opportunity to consider their age either as a reason to keep them in juvenile court
108. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470-71 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010)).
109. Id. at 2463 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
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or as a factor in sentencing." In other words, these schemes do not allow for
discretion in the transfer of the juvenile to criminal court; once in criminal court,
the juvenile is sentenced exclusively using adult criminal guidelines. The crime
with which the child is charged is entirely and exclusively dispositive of how the
child will be sentenced and processed in the criminal justice system.
Moreover, these are states in which mechanisms like juvenile blended sentencing and reverse waiver are unavailable for adjudicated youth charged with
particular crimes.'" Instead, after a finding of probable cause, these youths are
sent to the adult criminal justice system and treated as though they were adults for
the purposes of their trials and sentencing. There are eighteen states that impose
these mandatory schemes". 2 in contradiction of the admonition in Graham restated
forcefully in Miller: "An offender's age ... is relevant to the Eighth Amendthat fail to take defendants' youthfulness
ment... [and] criminal procedure laws
3
into account at all would be flawed." 1
2. Once an Adult, Always an Adult
A smaller minority within that group also include a provision referred to as
"once an adult, always an adult," under which juveniles who have previously been
adjudicated and convicted as adults are immediately processed in criminal court
for all future charges, regardless of what those charges may be." t 4 When mandatory adult prosecution occurs as a result of a prior conviction under one of the
mandatory sentencing schemes highlighted, the juvenile has not been afforded any
discretion at any stage of her two criminal sentences and the second criminal
proceeding flows inexorably from the mandatory nature of the first.' If a juvenile
were mandatorily transferred into the adult system for an offense, any subsequent
offense-no matter how small-would result in an adult criminal prosecution.
Juvenile offenses that in and of themselves are not contemplated as being properly
within the purview of criminal court will nevertheless produce criminal convictions for juveniles under this mandatory scheme.

110. See infra Table 1(listing eighteen states with mandatory transfer statutes).
111. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405/5-810(4) (2014) (providing for an adult sentence only where the
juvenile was prosecuted in adult court and the juvenile did not comply with the terms of the juvenile sentence).
112. See infra Table 1.
113. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
eighteen states we identify are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, and Utah. See infra Table 1.
114. See infra Table 1.
115. This law can be even harsher than it first appears, since in many states a child is only returned to juvenile
court jurisdiction if she is acquitted of all crimes in her criminal trial. In other words, because these statutes move
all charges into criminal court, if she is convicted of a lesser offense that by itself would not have subjected her to
transfer, but acquitted of the charge that sent her to criminal court, in subsequent proceedings she would still be
excluded from juvenile court under these harsh versions of "once an adult, always an adult." See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 12-15-203(i) (2014).
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When combined with a lack of reverse waiver options, a lack of sentencing
discretion, and the other mandatory features discussed above, this small group of
sentencing schemes is both at odds with Miller and with the practice in the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions nationwide. These schemes present the
most extreme versions of the Court's concern that transfer makes it "impossible" to
determine "the judgment these States have made regarding the appropriate
punishment for such youthful offenders.""7' 6 Only twelve states subscribe to this
extreme version of mandatory transfers.1
These states are outliers and indicative of a national consensus against a
sentencing scheme that relentlessly prevents a court from considering the age of a
juvenile offender at any point in the process.
Table 1: States that Do Not Consider Age when Sentencing Juveniles

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Connecticut

Relevant Transfer Multiple
Minimum
Offenses
Statute
Age
Method 1 18
ALA. CODE
Statutory
*
Exclusion § 12-15-204 (2014)
16
ALASKA STAT.
Statutory
*
Exclusion § 47.12.030 (2014)
16
ARIZ. REV.STAT. ANN.
Statutory
*
Exclusion § 13-501(A) (2014)
15
14

Mandatory
Transfer

Once an
Adult,
Always an
Adult1 19
*

*

CONN. GEN.STAT.

§ 46b-127 (2014)

*

DEL.CODE ANN. tit.

Statutory

11, § 1447A(f)
(2014)

15

Exclusion

16

Statutory
Exclusion

Kentucky

14

Mandatory
Transfer

§ 635.020(4) (West
2014)

Mandatory

A. CHILD. CODE ANN.

Louisiana

15

Delaware

D.C. CODE

District of
Columbia

§ 16-2301(3)
(2014)
KY. REV.

116.
117.
118.
119.

Transfer

*

*

STAT. ANN.

art. 305 (2014)

*

Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2472-73 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826 n.24 (1988)).
See infra
Table 1.
For discussion of the different methods, see supra Section I.A.2.
For explanation of the concept of "once an adult, always an adult," see supra note 27 and accompanying
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Minimum
Age
Method11 8

Relevant Transfer Multiple
Offenses
Statute

Once an
Adult,
Always an
Adult 1 19

MD. CODE ANN., CTS.
& JUD. PROC.

§ 3-8A-03 (West
2014)

14

Statutory
Exclusion

16

Statutory
Exclusion

New Jersey

16

Mandatory
Transfer

North Carolina

13

Mandatory N.C. GEN. STAT.
Transfer
§ 7B-2200 (2014)

Maryland

MINN. STAT.

Minnesota

§§ 260B.007(6)(b),
260B.101(2) (2014)
N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:4A-26(e)
(West 2014)

14 (or 16, if
transferred
via request
N.D. CENT. CODE
Mandatory
§ 27-20-34(1)(b)
from
Transfer
(2014)
North Dakota juvenile)
OHIO

Mandatory
Ohio

14

Transfer

15

Statutory
Exclusion

Oregon

15

Statutory
Exclusion

Rhode Island

17

Mandatory
Transfer

16

Statutory
Exclusion

REC. CODE ANN.

§ 2152.10(A) (West
2014)
OKLA. STAT. tit.

Oklahoma

10A,

§ 2-5-205(B)
(2014)
OR. REv. STAT.

§ 137.707(1)(a)
(2014)
R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 14-1-3(1) (2014)
UTAH CODE ANN.

Utah

§ 78A-6-701 (West
2014)

B. Sentencing Children as Children
1. ConstitutionallyInsufficient Schemes in Light of Miller
Miller makes clear that a court may not impose a sentence upon a juvenile

offender without taking into account the fact that the offender is a child. Citing
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Roper and Graham, the Miller Court reiterated,' 2 "children are constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing." 1 0
The Court attacked the claims made by Alabama and Arkansas that the presence
of discretion at the moment of transfer ensured the children received individualized consideration. 12 In this Eighth Amendment sentencing context, the Court
reiterated the concerns it raised in Graham that the process of transfer convolutes
the entire picture of juvenile sentencing. 122 When a legislature decides that a
juvenile should be transferred to adult court for a particular crime, it certainly
makes the judgment that children of a certain age who commit a particular crime
are either old enough to be in criminal court or have committed such a serious
crime that juvenile court is insufficiently retributive for them. But in making that
decision, has the legislature also endorsed the adult sentencing scheme as specifically appropriate for the children who are transferred? The Court did not think so:
transfer statutes tell "us nothing about the judgment these States have made
regarding the appropriate punishment for such youthful offenders." 123 Deciding to
send a child to adult criminal court is not, according to the Court, equivalent to
deciding that adult criminal punishment is appropriate for that particular child.
In addition to the problems of unintended consequences and insufficient
information at transfer hearings, the Court raised a further concern with the
unbroken link between the decision to transfer a juvenile to adult court and the
decision to sentence him as an adult:
[T]he question at transfer hearings may differ dramatically from the issue at a
post-trial sentencing.... [T]ransfer decisions often present a choice between
extremes: light punishment as a child or standard sentencing as an
adult .... Discretionary sentencing in adult court would provide different
options: There, a judge or jury could choose, rather than a life-without-parole
sentence, a lifetime prison term with the possibility of parole or a lengthy term
of years. It is easy to imagine a judge deciding that a minor deserves a (much)
harsher sentence than he would receive in juvenile court, while still not
thinking life-without-parole appropriate. For that reason, the discretion available to a judge at the transfer stage cannot substitute for discretion at post-trial
24
sentencing in adult court-and so cannot satisfy the Eighth Amendment. 1
After rejecting mandatory transfer, prosecutorial discretion, and schemes that do
not allow for reverse waiver as insufficient for the protection of the juvenile's
Eighth Amendment rights, the Court even noted the limitations of discretionary

120. 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
121. Id. at 2474-75.
122. Id.; see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2025-26 (2010) ("But the fact that transfer and direct
charging laws make life without parole possible for some juvenile nonhomicide offenders does not justify a
judgment that many States intended to subject such offenders to life without parole sentences.").
123. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2472-73 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826 n.24 (1988)).
124. Id. at 2474-75.
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judicial waivers, the transfer process that allows for the most discretion and
individualized decision-making:
Even when States give transfer-stage discretion to judges, it has limited utility.
First, the decisionmaker typically will have only partial information at this
early, pretrial stage about either the child or the circumstances of his offense.... The key moment for the exercise of discretion is the transfer-and
as Miller's case shows, the judge often does not know then what she will
learn,
125
about the offender or the offense, over the course of the proceedings.

Transfer is thus both a "key moment for the exercise of discretion" and a
moment where such discretion is insufficient to protect the rights of the juvenile.
What then, does Millerportend for juvenile transfer as a whole?
First, as explained above, Miller holds that mandatory transfer schemes that
allow no opportunity for consideration of the fact that the offender is a juvenile at
26
any stage of the process-from transfer to sentencing-are unconstitutional.
Second, in light of the Court's critiques of discretionary juvenile transfer procedures, any attempt to rid a child's age from the equation at sentencing is
unconstitutional. Miller requires profound changes in the ways states adjudicate
and sentence27juveniles; the responses from states thus far have been dramatically
inadequate. 1

2. Possible Solutions to Comply with Miller
Miller raises many issues regarding juvenile transfer and sentencing, but the
solutions are less clear. The Court appears to endorse the provision referred to as
juvenile blended sentencing-under which an adult criminal court may impose a
juvenile disposition on a child prosecuted there-when it approvingly discusses
the possibility of "[d]iscretionary sentencing in adult court."1 28 Another alternative

125. Id. at 2474.
126. While commentators are sure to note that much (but not all) of the Court language focuses on the
life-without-parole sentence in particular, "none of what it said about children... is crime-specific." Miller, 132
S. Ct. at 2465. Indeed, the Chief Justice's dissent quotes that sentence and then explains: "The principle behind
today's decision seems to be only that because juveniles are different from adults, they must be sentenced
differently. There is no clear reason that principle would not bar all mandatory sentences for juveniles, or any
juvenile sentence as harsh as what a similarly situated adult would receive. Unless confined, the only stopping
point for the Court's analysis would be never permitting juvenile offenders to be tried as adults." Id. at 2482
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Additionally, as discussed supra, the key conceptual categories in this decision are
children and adults; the sentence and crime are irrelevant for the purposes of the holding.
127. See Cara H. Drinan, MisconstruingGraham & Miller, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 785 (2014). Drinan argues that
the state-level response to Miller has been inadequate and suggests several less conventional paths for state-level
change, including executive action on the part of prosecutors, who should reconsider their charging and
sentencing policies for juveniles, and governors, who should consider the appointment of "Miller Commissions"
to address the retroactive application of the decision. Id. at 793-95.
128. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474.
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would be a separate sentencing scheme for juveniles within the criminal system. 121
Such a scheme must be designed explicitly for juveniles transferred into adult
criminal court and take account of the factors the Court has found significant in
juvenile sentencing, most significantly diminished culpability and greater capacity
for rehabilitation.' 30 A separate sentencing scheme would resolve the Court's
concern that the legislature was unaware-or at the very least, not mindful of-the
specific punishments that would result from juvenile transfer. Furthermore, its very
existence would satisfy the Miller insistence that a sentencing court cannot
"remov[e] youth from the balance"1 31 in sentencing a child and remain within
constitutional limits, but must instead assess proportionality in relation to the
offender's status as a juvenile.
One final possibility would be the most direct possible approach to sentencing
children as children: simply keeping them in juvenile court throughout their
adjudication. While entirely mandatory transfer schemes are the outliers in the
world of juvenile transfer and certainly outside the bounds of juvenile sentencing
endorsed by the Miller Court, the defendants in Miller were both juveniles who
had been transferred through discretionary schemes. 132 In other words, the Miller
Court held their sentences unconstitutional even though there had been some
treatment of the offenders as juveniles at some point in the process. That moment
of discretion was not enough to satisfy the Court's understanding of Eighth
Amendment proportionality as applied to juveniles. Yet beyond that somewhat
limited topic, the Court's discussion of discretion in transfer raises the possibility
that it might simply be impossible to transfer children to adult criminal court in a
way that is consistent with the "children are different" approach of the case.
Even if a prosecutor used her discretion to decide where to prosecute a case,
juvenile court or adult court, such a choice would place in the prosecutor in an
untenable situation. Juvenile sentences often expire at the age of majority, forcing
a prosecutor to make an impossible133choice between a very short "juvenile"
sentence and a lengthy adult sentence.

129. One scholar has suggested a "Youth Discount" in sentencing, such that "state legislators should use age as
a conclusive proxy for reduced culpability and provide substantial reductions in sentence lengths." Barry C. Feld,
Adolescent CriminalResponsibility, Proportionality,and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and
the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263, 264-65 (2013). This proposal would account for the factor of youth, but
in other respects a blanket statutory "discount" on adult sentences may be in tension with Miller's mandate for
individualized consideration.
130. Oregon imposes separate presumptive sentences for crimes that send juveniles to adult court and
mandates that courts impose at least that minimum, but the statute does not specifically require courts to consider
the factors raised in Miller when imposing the sentence. OR. REv. STAT. § 137.707 (2014).
131. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466.
132. Id. at 2461-62.
133. See 43 C.J.S. Infants § 160 (2014).
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C. Improving Reliability in Juvenile Adjudication
Miller relied on the Court's death penalty jurisprudence to conclude that
"children are different"' 134 and worthy of special consideration at sentencing.
Criminal sentences that fail to consider the mitigating factors of youth may violate
the Eighth Amendment and result in arbitrary sentences for adjudicated youth. The
Miller decision was limited to whether a child's age is relevant at sentencing.
Drawing on the same jurisprudence, we highlight several ways to prevent that
unconstitutional outcome and improve reliability in juvenile adjudication.
Permitting juveniles to present "any aspect of a [juvenile's] character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense"1 35 will improve the reliability of
juvenile adjudication. Jurisdictions with the death penalty apply this principle by
providing aggravating and mitigating factors for sentencing courts to consider
before imposing a sentence.1 36 These factors ensure that the sentencing court is
"suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
137
capricious action."'

Juveniles, like individuals potentially eligible for a death sentence, ought to be
entitled to present any information that may help the sentencing court reach a
reliable result. Juvenile justice includes rehabilitation-even when adult justice
might not. Meeting this important goal requires consideration of the juvenile, her
family, and her community. Death penalty jurisdictions often include these factors
in their sentencing guidelines. 138 Gathering and presenting this information would
require a much larger role for social workers and mental health professionals than
currently contemplated by most juvenile justice systems. The investment will be
well worth it, as sentencing courts will be able to more carefully tailor the
punishment to the offense and offender.
Increased standards and resources for counsel who represent juveniles will
likely improve reliability in juvenile adjudications. Juvenile cases are often
handled by the junior-most attorneys and standards and pay for appointed
counsel-assuming there are standards-are the lowest in our criminal justice

134. Id. at 2470.
135. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
136. States adopted this sentencing scheme after the Supreme Court endorsed it and struck down the primary
rival scheme, a circumscribed but mandatory death penalty. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193, 206-07

(1976) (endorsing weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325,
331-36 (1976) (holding that Louisiana's mandatory death penalty statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments); Woodson v. North, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (finding North Carolina's mandatory death penalty
unconstitutional).
137. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.

138. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.ANN. § 13-751(G)(1), (5) (2014) (jury to consider defendant's mental health
and age at time of crime); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 2014) ("Any other circumstance that extenuates the
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.3(6), (7)
(2014) (age and mental health of defendant); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2000(f)(7), (9) (2014) (age or "[a]ny other
circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating value").
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system. 139 We owe our children more. Improving the quality of counsel in death
penalty litigation has improved the reliability of the administration of the death
penalty. The same would surely be true for juveniles.
CONCLUSION

Miller v. Alabama was a watershed decision for juvenile justice. In addition to
the hundreds of individuals whose sentences should be reconsidered in light of this
holding, 140 the decision's holding that "children are different" and require "individualized consideration" at sentencing invalidates a number of current sentencing
schemes. It also demands additional procedural protections that should better
account for the vulnerabilities of youth within the justice system.
Most notably, state sentencing schemes that fail to take account of age at any
stage of the process should be held unconstitutional in light of Miller. A minority
of states subscribe to such schemes-and an even smaller group embraces the
harshest version through use of "once an adult, always an adult" statutessuggesting a national consensus against criminal sentencing that puts on blindfolds
when a child is standing in the courtroom.
Yet the Court requires even more. Between Miller's demand for individualized
consideration of a child's age at sentencing, the additional procedural protections
afforded juveniles in J.D.B., and the robust language differentiating children and
adults in several recent cases, the Court is poised to demand more of the criminal
justice system when children are involved. Drawing on our system's experience
with the death penalty, we have offered several suggestions for stronger protections for the adjudication of vulnerable youth.

139. See Birckhead, supra note 15, at 1498; Laura Cohen, A New Hope Found in Practice Standards, 23 CRIM.
JUsT. 49, 49 (2009) (nationally, juveniles face "inadequate access to counsel at all stages of delinquency

proceedings; insufficient time, training, and resources; and frequent failures to advocate for necessary mental
health and educational services"); Barbara Fedders, Losing the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
in Juvenile Delinquenry Proceedings Representation, 14 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 771, 798-99 (2010); Jerry R.
Foxhoven, Effective Assistance of Counsel: Quality of Representation for Juveniles is Still Illusory, 9 BARRY L.
REv. 99, 119 (2007).
140. The retroactive application of Miller has proven to be a difficult and divisive question. Compare People v.
Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 832 (Mich. 2014) (holding Miller does not apply retroactively), and Chambers v. State,
831 N.W.2d 311, 331 (Minn. 2013) (same), with Evans-Garcia v. United States, 744 F.3d 235, 238, 241 (1st Cir.
2014) (accepting government concession of retroactivity), Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720, 720 (8th Cir.
2013) (holding Minnesota juvenile sentenced to life without parole entitled to file a successive habeas petition
because he made out a prima facie case of Miller relief), Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
112981, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 12, 2013) ("[E]very person convicted of first-degree murder in the State of
Michigan as a juvenile and who was sentenced to life in prison shall be eligible for parole."), and Marsha L.
Levick & Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller v. Jackson: Obtaining Relief in Court and Before
the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 374-88 (2013) (concluding that Miller must be retroactive). Ultimately
the Supreme Court will likely have to settle the issue. Whatever the federal result, states are free to apply Miller
retroactively. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 266 (2008) (holding that states are free to apply rules of
retroactivity more broadly than federal law requires).

2015]

MANDATING DISCRETION

The Miller Court insists, "imposition of a State's most severe penalties on
juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children." 141 In light of
the Court's recognition that "none of what... [is] said about children-about their
distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities-is
crime-specific,"' 142 courts must always take into account a child's age through the
individualized consideration dictated by Miller and should ensure that the sentences imposed upon juvenile offenders are reliable and just.

141. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466.
142. Id. at 2465.

